Book Club
October 26, 202613 min read
On War
By:Ahmed Khan
Carl Von Clausewitz. Born in Burb near Magdeburg in Prussia in 1780. In his teens he fought against France in the French Revolutionary Wars.
Chapter 1 - What is war?
War is nothing but a dual on a larger scale. To introduce the principle of moderation to the theory of war itself would be logical absurdity. If the enemy is to be coerced you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call him to make. If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors: the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will. War never breaks out wholly unexpectedly nor can it be spread instantaneously. Man and his affairs, however, are always something short of perfect and will never quite achieve the absolute best. Even the ultimate outcome of war is not always to be regarded as final. Defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack. The slower the progress and the more frequent the interruptions of military action the easier it is to retrieve a mistake.Men are always more inclined to pitch their estimate of the enemy’s strength too high than too low, such is human nature. War is an act of policy. War should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy.
Chapter 2 - Purpose and means in war.
The fighting forces must be destroyed; that is, they must be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight. The country must be occupied; otherwise the enemy could raise fresh military forces. Both cannot be considered to have ended hostility so long as the enemy’s will has not been broken. Inability to carry on the struggle can, in practice, be replaced by two other grounds for making peace; the improbability of victory or its unacceptable cost.
Not every war need be fought until one side collapses. When the motives and tensions of war are slight we can imagine that the very faintest prospect of defeat might be enough to cause one side to yield. War is controlled by it’s political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration. The side that feels the lesser urge for peace will naturally get the better bargain.
How can success be made more likely? Choose objectives that will incidentally bring about the enemy’s collapse - the destruction of his armed forces and the conquest of his territory. Breaking all resistance with maximum effort. Obtaining a single victory to make the enemy insecure so as to only expend effort necessary. Perform actions with direct political repercussions which can influence alliances to formulate a favourable political environment.
How to influence the enemy’s expenditure? Wastage of his forces (destruction of them); his loss of territory (our conquest). Invasion - seizure of enemy territory without the object of retaining it but rather to extract financial contributions or lay it to waste - Simple object of general damage. Giving priority to operations that increase the enemy’s suffering. Wear down the enemy - using the duration of the war to bring about a gradual exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance.
The minimum object is pure-self defense. But resistance is a form of action aimed, at destroying enough of the enemy’s power to force him to renounce his intentions. It is inherent in the very concept of war that everything that occurs must originally derive from combat. Combat in war is not a contest between individuals. Combat itself is made an element of war by its very purpose, by its objective. The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of his eating, sleeping, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place at the right time. Combat is the only effective force in war; its aim is to destroy the enemy’s forces as a means to a further end. That holds good even if no actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed.
The advantage that the destruction of the enemy possesses over all other means is balanced by its cost and danger; and it is only in order to avoid these risks that other policies are employed. The greater the success we seek, the greater will be the damage if we fail. The destruction of the enemy's forces always appears as the highest possible aim in war.
Chapter 3 - Military Genius
If every soldier had to be a genius the armies would be very weak.
Possession of military genius coincides with the higher degrees of civilization; the most highly developed societies produce the most brilliant soldiers.
War is the realm of physical exertion and suffering, the realm of chance and uncertainty.
Courage is of two kinds: courage in the face of personal danger (permanent/non-permanent), and courage to accept responsibility. The highest kind of courage is a compound of both.
The Commander continually finds that things are not as he expected.
The latest reports do not arrive all at once, they merely trickle in.
To emerge with an unscathed mind:
An intellect retains some glimmering of the inner light which lead to truth.
Courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.
Cavalry attack - a decision dependent on time and space. Requires rapid and accuracy.
Intelligence alone is not courage.
2 indispensable qualities: Coup d’oeil and determination
Courage d’espirit - courage in the face of moral danger.
Since in the rush of events a man is governed by feelings rather than by thought, the intellect needs to arouse the quality of courage, which then supports and sustains it in action.
Determination which dispels doubt is a quality that can be aroused only by the intellect and by a specific cast of mind at that.
Men of low intelligence therefore cannot possess determination in the sense in which we use the word. They may act without hesitation in a crisis but if they do they act without reflection, and a man who acts without reflection cannot of course be torn by doubt.
It is the average result that indicates the existence of military genius.
Inflammable emotions, feelings that are easily roused, are in general of little value in practical life, and therefore of little value in war.
Obviously a man whose opinions are constantly changing, even though this is in response to his own reflections, would not be called a man of character.
A firm decision, based on fundamental principle derived from reflection is relatively immune to changes of opinion.
Sense of locality - it is the faculty of quickly and accurately grasping the topography of any area which enables a man to find his way about at any time.
To bring a war, or one of its campaigns, to a successful close requires a thorough grapes of national policy. The commander-in-chief is simultaneously a statesman.
Truth in itself is rarely sufficient to make men act.
The most powerful springs of action in men lie in his emotions.
Most of the arguments and clashes of opinion that precede a major operation are deliberately concealed because they touch political interests, or they are simply forgotten, being considered as scaffolding to be demolished when the building is complete.
What sort of mind is likeliest to display the qualities of military genius? Experience and observation will both tell us that it is the inquiring rather than the creative mind, the comprehensive rather than the specialized approach, the calm rather than the excitable head to which in war we would choose to entrust the fate of our brothers and children, and the safety and honour of our country.
Chapter 4 - On Danger in War
To someone who has never experienced danger, the idea is attractive rather than alarming.
Danger is part of the friction of war. Without an accurate conception of danger we cannot understand war.
Chapter 5 - On Physical Effort in War
Among the many factors in war that cannot be measured, physical effort is the most important. Unless it is wanted, physical effort is a coefficient of all forces, and its exact limit cannot be determined.
No one can count on sympathy if he accepts an insult or mistreatment because he claims to be physically handicapped. But if he manages to defend or revenge himself, a reference to his handicap will be to his advantage.
Chapter 6 - Intelligence in War
He should be guided by the laws of probability.
In short, most intelligence is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies. As a rule most men would rather believe bad news than good, and rather tend to exaggerate the bad news.
The commander must trust his judgement and stand like a rock on which the waves break in vain.
Chapter 7 - Friction in War
Everything in war is very simple but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.
Countless minor incidents combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal. Iron will-power can overcome this friction but of course it wears down the machine as well.
Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.
This tremendous friction is everywhere in contact with chance (weather).
Chapter 8 - Concluding Observations on Book One
Habit hardens the body for great exertions, strengthens the heart in great peril and fortifies judgement against first impressions.
Peace does not often reign everywhere in Europe, and never throughout the whole world. A state that has been at peace for many years should try to attract some experienced officers. Alternatively, some of its own officers should be sent to observe operations and learn what war is like.
Book two - On the Theory of War
Book Seven - The Attack
Every method of defense leads to a method of attack.
The offensive thrust or action is complete in itself. It does not have to be complemented by defence; but dominating considerations of time and space do introduce defence as a necessary evil.
Periods of rest are needed, during which the attack is neutralized, the area left in rear of the advance forces is not necessarily covered by the attack and needs special protection.
The act of attack, particularly in strategy, is thus a constant alternation and combination of attack and defence.
It follows that every attack has to take into account the defence that is necessarily inherent in it, in order clearly to understand its disadvantages and to anticipate them.
There is no growth of intensity of an attack comparable to that of the various types of defense.
The object of strategic attack may be thought of in numerous gradations, from the conquest of a whole country to that of an insignificant hamlet. As soon as the objective has been attained the attack ends and the defence takes over.
It is rare, or at any rate uncommon, for a general to set out with a firm objective in mind, rather, he will make it dependent on the course of events. Frequently, his attack may lead him further than he expected.
The diminishing force of the attack is one of the strategist’s main concerns.
A weakening of the attack may be partially or completely cancelled out or outweighed by the weakening of the defence.
Success in attack results from the availability of superior strength including of course both physical and moral.
The attacker is purchasing advantages that may become valuable at the peace table, but he must pay for them on the spot with his fighting forces.
The engagement, is the only means of destroying the enemy’s forces, but it may act in two different ways, directly or indirectly by a combination of engagements.
The capture of a fortress or a strip of territory also amounts to the destruction of enemy forces. It may lead to further destruction, and thereby become an indirect means as well.
The defender cannot actually use the full potential offered by his situation. In most cases, defence is a sorry, makeshift affair; the defender is usually in a tight and dangerous spot in which because he expects the worse, he meets the attack half-way.
Too much haste on the other hand, leads to the risk of wasting one’s forces. A peculiarity in most offensive battles is doubt about the enemy’s position.
Book Eight - War Plans
Soon the soldier hired on short-term contract evolved into the permanent mercenary, and the armed force of the state had become a standing army, paid for by the treasury.
The evolution from nomadic to settled lifestyles also included the soldier and his army.
The enemy’s cash resources, his treasury and his credit, were all approximately known; so was the size of his fighting forces.
Envy, jealousy, anxiety, and sometimes perhaps even generosity are the natural advocates of the unsuccessful - they will win new friends and divide his enemies.
Time, then, is less likely to bring favour to the victor than to the vanquished. Thus time can become a factor in the conqueror’s strength as well; but only on condition that a counterattack on him is no longer possible, that no reversal is conceivable.
No conquest can be carried out too quickly, and that to spread it over a longer period than the minimum needed to complete it makes it not less difficult, but more.
Our belief then is that any kind of interruptions, pause, or suspension of activity is inconsistent with the nature of offensive war. When they are avoidable, they must be regarded as necessary evils, which make success not more but less certain.
One country may support another’s cause, but will never take it so seriously as it takes its own. Even when both share a major interest, action is clogged with diplomatic reservations, and as a rule the negotiators only pledge a small and limited contingent, so that the rest can be kept in hand for any special ends the shifts of policy may require.
What is highly dangerous is to let any soldier but the commander-in-chief exert an influence in the cabinet. It very seldom leads to sound vigorous action.
It follows that the transformation of the art of war resulted from the transformation of politics.
Capturing enemy territory will reduce the strength of our forces in varying degrees, which are determined by the location of the occupied territory. If it adjoins our own - the less our strength will suffer.
In general one tends to lose more from occupation by the enemy than one gains from conquering his territory, even if the value of both areas should be identical. The reason is that a whole range of resources are denied to us.
If we consider the relative exhaustion of forces on both sides, the defender is at a disadvantage. For one thing, he is weaker anyway, and if losses are the same on both sides, it is he who is harder hit. Second, the enemy will usually deprive him of part of his territory and resources.
A major victory can only be obtained by positive measures aimed at a decision, never by simply waiting on events.