Markets
November 15, 202633 min read
Making Propaganda
By:Ahmed Khan
Understanding the reality of persuasion.
Origins of News
Historically, modern news began in print, evolved through telegraph wires, and then bifurcated into very different models in North America versus Europe when radio and television arrived in the 1920s.
The earliest European news sheets (avvisi in Venice, corantos in Amsterdam and London) were printed for merchants, bankers, and shipowners [1]. They didn't care about human-interest stories; they needed to know if a ship sank, if a war broke out, or if a harvest failed so they could price commodities and insure cargo.
Monarchs and governments printed official gazettes to publish laws and rally support for wars [2]. Conversely, during the American and French Revolutions, newspapers were fiercely partisan political weapons funded directly by political factions to mobilize voters and attack rivals.
Initializing Propaganda
The word propaganda was created by the Roman Catholic Church in 1622. Its mission was not political or deceptive at first; rather, it was an administrative body designed to oversee foreign missions, train priests, and spread Catholic teachings in non-Catholic or newly colonized regions.
The term comes from the Modern Latin gerundive propagare, which means "to spread" or "to propagate". Literally translated, propaganda means "things that are to be propagated". Pope Gregory XV established a committee called the Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith) as part of the Counter-Reformation.
By the late 1700s, the term expanded beyond the Church to describe secular political movements and organizations. Following large-scale government information campaigns during World War I and World War II, the word took on its modern, often negative meaning of systematically distributing biased, misleading, or manipulative information to shape public opinion.
After World War I, pioneers like Edward Bernays deliberately promoted "public relations" as a respectable, business-friendly alternative to propaganda.
In 1967, Pope Paul VI renamed the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith to the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples, and in 2022, Pope Francis merged it into the Dicastery for Evangelization.
Evangelization is viewed positively as a respectful invitation. It focuses on sharing a message openly while fully respecting the other person's freedom to accept or reject it.
Today, governments, corporations, and media organizations replace the word "propaganda" with neutral terms like public relations (PR), strategic communications, and information operations.
Globalization of Propaganda
No country is completely free of persuasive messaging, since commercial advertising and political campaigning exist everywhere. Yet when examining governments that run foreign influence operations, China and Russia consistently stand out as the largest producers in terms of budget, volume, and global reach. At the domestic level, governments and private corporations across more than eighty countries rely on organized digital influence campaigns to shape public opinion.
China
Chinese propaganda represents the most heavily funded and technologically sophisticated information apparatus in the world. Guided by the Chinese Communist Party, Beijing views global narrative control as essential to protecting its political system, expanding its economic footprint, and reshaping international norms in its favor. Rather than relying on a single tactic, China combines massive state media expansion with covert digital networks and commercial media partnerships.
The Chinese system is centrally orchestrated by the Chinese Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department and the United Front Work Department, working alongside military cyber units and private technology contractors. On the public stage, state conglomerates such as China Global Television Network, Xinhua News Agency, and China Radio International broadcast in dozens of languages across every continent. Beneath this official layer, state-backed operators manage vast networks of deceptive social media accounts and shell companies. Their primary goals are to promote China as a benevolent global leader, silence international criticism regarding human rights in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, weaken democratic resolve over Taiwan, and erode public confidence in Western governance.
Beijing tailors its messaging across distinct global audiences to maximize strategic leverage. Taiwan faces the most intense and continuous pressure, with campaigns designed to demoralize voters, sow distrust between Taipei and Washington, and convince citizens that unification is inevitable. Across the Global South, particularly in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, China invests heavily in shaping favorable coverage of its Belt and Road infrastructure projects while portraying Western nations as declining colonial powers. Inside Western democracies such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, operations target political leaders, academic institutions, and Chinese diaspora communities to influence foreign policy and suppress dissent.
To penetrate foreign information environments without triggering immediate skepticism, Chinese operators rely on large-scale digital camouflage and commercial content deals. Cybersecurity researchers have extensively documented the Spamouflage network, an enormous operation comprising hundreds of thousands of fake accounts across X, Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok that flood platforms with coordinated political messaging mixed alongside mundane lifestyle posts to evade detection.
Beyond social media, Beijing excels at laundering state narratives through seemingly independent local news outlets. Investigations by Citizen Lab and cybersecurity firms have uncovered networks like PAPERWALL and Glassbridge, which consist of more than a thousand impostor local news websites posing as authentic publications in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. At the same time, Chinese state agencies sign content-sharing agreements and purchase paid supplements inside mainstream foreign newspapers, allowing Beijing's official talking points to appear under the banner of trusted local journalism.
Russia
Russian propaganda operates as a deeply centralized, state-directed apparatus backed by intelligence agencies, military units, and massive government budgets. Moscow treats information warfare as a permanent strategic weapon designed to weaken adversaries from within rather than merely promote a positive national image.
The Kremlin coordinates its messaging through a combination of overt state media giants and covert intelligence proxies. On the surface, state-funded networks such as RT and Sputnik broadcast Kremlin-approved narratives in dozens of languages across the globe. Beneath that public layer, Russian military intelligence, the Federal Security Service, and private contractors run clandestine troll farms and cyber operations. The primary objective is rarely to make foreign audiences admire Russia. Instead, Moscow seeks to sow deep domestic division, erode public trust in democratic elections and institutions, fracture international alliances such as NATO and the European Union, and cut off Western military and financial support for Ukraine.
Russian influence operations cast a wide net, focusing most intensely on nations that shape global security or sit along Russia's geopolitical borders. Ukraine remains the primary target, absorbing relentless waves of psychological warfare aimed at demoralizing citizens and fracturing political unity. Beyond the front lines, Moscow concentrates heavily on the United States and major European Union powers like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, attempting to inflame existing cultural anxieties over immigration, inflation, and energy costs during critical election cycles. Former Soviet republics such as Moldova and Georgia also face continuous interference meant to stall their integration into Western institutions, while campaigns across West Africa seek to push out European influence and secure lucrative mining and security deals for Moscow.
Russian operations excel at industrial-scale automation, brand hijacking, and algorithmic manipulation. One of the Kremlin's signature methods is the Doppelganger campaign, which constructs hundreds of spoofed websites that copy the exact visual design, logos, and web addresses of trusted Western outlets like The Washington Post, Le Monde, and Der Spiegel to trick readers into sharing fabricated news.
Even more ambitious is Moscow's effort to corrupt the foundational layer of the modern internet. Through sprawling automated networks such as the Pravda ecosystem, Russian operators publish millions of repetitive, pro-Kremlin articles across hundreds of obscure domains every year. Rather than trying to attract human readers directly, this massive flood of text is engineered to manipulate search engine rankings and poison the training data of large language models, ensuring that artificial intelligence chatbots around the world absorb and repeat Russian state narratives as objective truth.
Ukraine
Ukrainian information operations and bot networks operate across three overlapping ecosystems rather than a single centralized apparatus, combining state strategic communications, decentralized volunteer collectives, and commercial domestic farms. While traditional automated bot farms utilizing SIM banks and fake accounts certainly exist inside the country, many are actually financed by Russian handlers or hired by domestic Ukrainian political factions and oligarchs to manufacture outrage and smear rivals during local scandals. In the broader wartime context, Kyiv relies far more heavily on agile public relations and human crowdsourcing, mobilizing groups like the IT Army and the meme-driven North Atlantic Fellas Organization to swarm social media algorithms, amplify battlefield successes, and drown out Kremlin narratives.
These digital campaigns are carefully segmented by platform and language to achieve distinct strategic objectives across different audiences. To maintain vital military and financial aid, state agencies and volunteer networks target Western publics and policymakers on platforms like X, TikTok, and Reddit, framing Ukraine as a resilient democratic bulwark while mocking Russian military incompetence. Simultaneously, Ukrainian intelligence conducts targeted psychological operations on Telegram and VKontakte aimed at demoralizing Russian soldiers and civilians by circulating casualty figures, surrender instructions, and anti-mobilization messaging, all while working to sustain domestic morale at home.
Although modern digital mobilization in Ukraine first took root during the 2014 Euromaidan revolution and commercialized rapidly ahead of the 2019 elections, the 2022 full-scale invasion transformed it into an asymmetric, industrialized information war. Today, this ecosystem continues to grow, though its methods have evolved past easily detectable, server-based automated bots. Instead, operators increasingly rely on AI-assisted human accounts, micro-influencers, and multi-language synthetic media that allow small teams to run complex influence campaigns that are vastly more difficult for social media platforms to identify and police.
Iran
Iranian propaganda operates as an ideological and strategic shield designed to project regional power, undermine geopolitical rivals, and safeguard the survival of the Islamic Republic. While its budget is smaller than those of larger global superpowers, Tehran compensates through highly coordinated digital networks, multilingual state broadcasters, and agile covert operations that blend religious messaging with geopolitical grievances.
The Iranian apparatus is directed by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting alongside the cyber and intelligence divisions of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. On the overt side, state networks such as Press TV, HispanTV, and Al Alam produce news in English, Spanish, Arabic, and French to reach international viewers. Behind the scenes, intelligence units and private contractors operate sprawling networks of inauthentic social media accounts and fake news websites. Their core objectives are to bolster Tehran's regional network of allied militias, delegitimize Israel and the United States, amplify social and racial tensions inside Western democracies, and suppress dissent among Iranian expatriates abroad.
Iranian campaigns target distinct audiences across three main geographic fronts. Across the Middle East, messaging focuses heavily on populations in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories to build popular support for Tehran and frame Western military presence as an existential threat. Inside Western democracies, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, Iranian operators target voters during major election cycles to deepen political polarization and sway foreign policy debates. Simultaneously, Tehran directs persistent surveillance and harassment campaigns at the global Iranian diaspora, aiming to intimidate exiled journalists, activists, and critics of the regime.
Rather than relying purely on brute-force automation, Iranian influence networks specialize in deceptive mimicry and targeted persona building. Cybersecurity researchers at firms like Mandiant and Meta have repeatedly uncovered vast clusters of fake news websites that pose as independent local publications or progressive activist blogs across North America, Europe, and Latin America. These sites disguise Tehran's talking points inside genuine local political debates so unsuspecting readers share them organically.
In recent years, Iranian operators have also rapidly adopted artificial intelligence to scale their reach at a low cost. Threat intelligence reports show that Iranian networks routinely generate synthetic profile photos, fabricate fake journalist identities, and use large language models to translate and tailor divisive articles into fluent English, French, and Spanish. Combined with coordinated campaigns that hijack trending hashtags and amplify real grassroots protests, these methods allow Tehran to punch well above its financial weight in the global information arena.
India
Unlike centralized authoritarian states where a single government ministry dictates every public message, Indian information campaigns operate through a decentralized ecosystem of political party divisions, private holding companies, partisan broadcasters, and vast volunteer networks. Researchers at the Oxford Internet Institute and EU DisinfoLab categorize these efforts into two distinct tracks, namely massive domestic political campaigning and covert international narrative shaping.
Inside India, the primary architects of digital influence are the Information Technology cells operated by major political parties, most notably the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party alongside opposition groups like the Indian National Congress. These units employ full-time strategists and private contractors year-round to mobilize voters, build powerful personal brands around political leaders, discredit rivals, and inflame nationalist or religious divisions ahead of elections. On the international front, the goals shift toward geopolitical rivalry and diplomatic leverage. Major investigations by EU DisinfoLab traced a massive fifteen-year foreign influence network known as Indian Chronicles to the Srivastava Group, a private holding company based in New Delhi. The overarching purpose of these external operations is to isolate regional rivals like Pakistan and China, counter separatist movements abroad, and discredit foreign critics of the Indian government.
The targets of these campaigns span from rural Indian villages to the halls of global diplomacy. Domestically, hundreds of millions of smartphone users receive hyper-localized content tailored by caste, religion, region, and language. Internationally, operations specifically target diplomats, lawmakers, and journalists at institutions such as the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva and the European Parliament in Brussels. In addition, intelligence assessments from countries like Canada have documented foreign influence campaigns aimed at Western politicians, local news outlets, and diaspora communities in order to shape public debate and suppress criticism of New Delhi.
While automated software bots do play a role in amplifying hashtags on platforms like X, cybersecurity researchers emphasize that Indian influence networks rely far more heavily on human labor and institutional laundering than on pure automation. Domestically, political parties mobilize hundreds of thousands of real human volunteers and paid workers, often referred to as cyber troops. Central coordinators distribute daily digital documents filled with pre-written posts, talking points, and manipulated images, which volunteers simultaneously copy, paste, and forward through hundreds of thousands of encrypted WhatsApp groups to bypass automated platform detection.
For international audiences, operators rely on a sophisticated laundering technique designed to manufacture credibility. During the Indian Chronicles investigation, researchers uncovered more than seven hundred and fifty fake local news websites operating across over a hundred countries, alongside defunct non-governmental organizations and the stolen identities of deceased human rights scholars. These impostor outlets would publish pro-India or anti-Pakistan commentary, which mainstream Indian wire services and television networks would then cite as legitimate international journalism, creating a self-reinforcing echo loop that elevated fabricated narratives into accepted public fact.
Authoritarian State Monopolies
While superpowers like China and Russia build sprawling apparatuses to project power outward, a second tier of authoritarian regimes focuses its heaviest fire inward, treating total domestic information control as the primary requirement for regime survival. In these states, propaganda is not merely one political tool among many—it is the entire information environment.
At the most extreme end of this spectrum sit nations such as North Korea, Eritrea, Turkmenistan, and Belarus, which operate total state monopolies over television, radio, and internet infrastructure. In Eritrea—the only African nation with zero privately owned domestic news outlets—and North Korea—where radios and televisions are hardware-locked to receive only state frequencies—independent journalism is not merely restricted; it is physically and legally erased. Following mass protests in 2020, the Belarusian regime systematically liquidated virtually every independent publication in the country, forcing reporters into exile while state broadcasters like Belteleradio air confessions of political prisoners and Kremlin-aligned messaging around the clock.
Yet modern autocrats have increasingly realized that shutting down newspapers with outright bans and police raids draws unwanted international isolation. Instead, leaders in countries such as Hungary, Turkey, Serbia, and Venezuela have perfected a far subtler model known as media capture, using economic leverage and regulatory pressure to control roughly eighty percent or more of domestic outlets while preserving the outward appearance of a free press.
Under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Hungary became the global blueprint for this approach. Rather than censoring private outlets directly, pro-government oligarchs bought up nearly five hundred private newspapers, television channels, and radio stations before donating them all at once into a single massive holding conglomerate called the Central European Press and Media Foundation. The government promptly declared the merger of national strategic importance to exempt it from antitrust laws, while funneling billions of forints in state advertising exclusively to loyal outlets and starving independent holdouts of revenue.
Turkey employs a similar playbook through crony conglomerates. Construction, energy, and telecommunications giants that depend on lucrative government infrastructure contracts—such as Demirören Holding and Turkuvaz Media—have bought up the country’s largest legacy newspapers and television networks, including Hürriyet and CNN Türk. For these conglomerates, absorbing financial losses on a news network is simply the cost of doing business with Ankara. The few independent broadcasters that remain face crippling fines and broadcast suspensions from the state media regulator, ensuring that even in a nominally private market, the ruling party dictates the national narrative.
The United States
Unlike state-centralized apparatuses in Russia or China, the digital influence ecosystem in the United States is split between overt foreign psychological operations run by the military and decentralized domestic astroturfing driven by private political consultants.
On the government side, the Department of Defense funds Military Information Support Operations at roughly $250 million annually to shape foreign target audiences, though recent platform crackdowns have forced a major strategic pivot. After social media companies suspended a network of roughly one hundred fifty covert Pentagon-linked accounts in 2022 [3], military operators largely abandoned traditional sockpuppet bot farms. Instead, modern U.S. influence campaigns rely on network websites and paid platform advertisements that generate tens of millions of views abroad without needing massive volumes of fake accounts.
Domestically, federal law prohibits government propaganda inside the United States, leaving bot and troll activity to partisan super PACs, private PR firms, and digital marketing contractors. During major election cycles, these private actors spend tens of millions of dollars on digital astroturfing, deploying networks that range from hundreds of paid human operatives to thousands of automated social media accounts. Rather than maintaining permanent state-run server farms, American political operations typically rent short-term capacity from commercial manipulation markets, where bulk SMS-verified accounts and engagement boosts can be purchased on demand to manipulate trending algorithms or brigade rival candidates.
Today, the technical capacity of U.S.-based influence operations has shifted away from raw account volume toward artificial intelligence and hyper-targeted micro-persuasion. With generative AI slashing the cost of content creation, small teams of domestic political operatives can deploy autonomous agent swarms capable of running thousands of realistic, context-aware conversations simultaneously across X, TikTok, and Reddit. While total account numbers remain smaller than the massive industrial farms operated by Beijing or Moscow, the combination of advanced language models and massive campaign war chests gives American political operatives an unmatched capacity to fabricate grassroots consensus.
Developed Propaganda
In Western democracies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, overt state-run propaganda plays a much smaller role, and publicly funded broadcasters like the BBC and the CBC operate with editorial independence. Rather than relying on top-down state censorship, persuasive messaging in these nations flows primarily through private corporations, partisan media ecosystems, and sophisticated political marketing.
While the word originated in 17th-century Rome and European empires used heavy propaganda during the World Wars, modern European nations have largely dismantled state-controlled media monopolies in favor of independent journalism and strict democratic safeguards.
Lobbying
In open democracies, the most organized persuasion is aimed first at the few hundred people who write laws, not at the public. Lobbying is propaganda with a very small target audience. Public relations campaigns, think tank reports and advertising then create the feeling among voters that lawmakers are simply responding to popular demand.
Every year, major corporations across the fossil fuel, pharmaceutical, and technology sectors invest tens of billions of dollars into public relations, think tanks, and strategic advertising to shape both consumer habits and public policy.
During election cycles, this influence becomes even more targeted. Research from the Oxford Internet Institute demonstrates that political parties in democratic nations routinely hire private digital marketing firms to deploy micro-targeted advertisements, coordinate influencer networks, and manufacture grassroots support through astroturfing campaigns.
Meanwhile, the broader media landscape often reinforces these efforts. Cable news networks, partisan digital publications, and algorithmic social media feeds frequently rely on business models that reward outrage, selective framing, and ideological loyalty rather than neutral reporting, creating an environment where persuasive spin easily eclipses objective journalism.
The United States
The American system is the most heavily financed in the world, and because federal disclosure rules require dollar amounts, it is also the most measurable. OpenSecrets put 2025 federal lobbying spending at about $5.08 billion, an 11 percent increase over 2024 after adjusting for inflation. Bloomberg Government’s separate analysis of Lobbying Disclosure Act filings came to roughly $5.3 billion. A total of 15,768 organizations reported lobbying during the year, up from 14,061 in 2024. Health care leads by sector: it put a record $868 million into lobbying while dealing with uncertainty over federal policy, including Medicaid cuts in the tax and spending package signed in July.
Disclosure has limits. Federal lobbying reports do not say whether a company supported or opposed a bill, so the public sees how much was spent without seeing what the money was for. The government runs its own persuasion operation as well. The Government Accountability Office found that federal agencies spend nearly $1.5 billion a year on advertising and public relations. Most of that is routine public service messaging. Its direction can still shift with the administration in power. The Department of Homeland Security tripled its ad spending in fiscal 2025, producing record contract obligations as it carried out the president’s immigration agenda. In principle, the law sets a limit. Appropriations law bars spending on publicity or propaganda that Congress has not authorized, and agencies cannot use government money for advertising that lobbies Congress.
Canada
Canada’s system is smaller and, in one important way, more opaque. The federal registry records who met whom without recording how much was spent. In 2024 to 2025, more than 8,800 lobbyists were registered, with over 6,000 active registrations at any given time. Reports of oral, arranged lobbying of designated public office holders came to just over 31,000. Most of these lobbyists are not hired consultants. Of those who registered, 7,214 worked directly for their employers, with 2,924 at corporations and 4,290 at organizations. In July 2025, Commissioner Nancy Bélanger issued guidance that significantly lowered the threshold at which corporations and organizations must register their own internal lobbying.
Ottawa’s advertising budget is small compared with Washington’s. The federal government reported $78.15 million in advertising spending for the 2024 to 2025 fiscal year across 46 institutions, about 63 percent of it on digital media. Ontario’s Auditor General recorded the province’s highest government advertising spending ever, $111.9 million in 2024/25.
Who Gets Targetted?
Persuasion budgets go where they move outcomes. The first audience is lawmakers, their staff and regulators. They are the direct audience of lobbying, and there are few enough of them that each one is worth millions.
The second audience is voters who can be persuaded or who turn out reliably. Campaigns and advocacy groups divide them by age and issue. A University of Amsterdam researcher found that younger voters are more likely to see ads about education, while older voters see more about healthcare or inflation, whether or not the topic fits the party’s usual profile. Older voters get the most attention. They vote reliably and are more likely to own homes.
The third audience is groups that can be discouraged from voting. A University of Wisconsin at Madison study found that vote suppression ads were placed through Facebook’s microtargeting tools to reach mostly nonwhite voting age people in hotly contested states. The measured effect was a 2 percent dip in overall turnout and a 14 percent decline among nonwhite voters in swing state counties with large minority populations.
The fourth audience is young adults, approached through influencers and aspirational messaging. A 2025 focus group study of young social media users found little intuitive reflection about targeted political ads and the disclosures attached to them.
Selling the Housing Market
Real estate shows how lobbying, advertising and public policy combine into a single message. Owning a home is presented as the path to security, and policies that could lower prices are framed as threats to household wealth.
Industry ads, government programs, the tax code and popular culture all say that owning a home is the responsible path to security and wealth, and that renting is “throwing money away.” When one idea comes from that many directions at once, people stop questioning it.
In 2024, the National Association of Realtors was the top lobbying spender in America, working on housing, taxes, insurance, banking and other issues. In 2025 it ranked second at $54.4 million, behind only the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Its pace has not slowed. NAR reported $27.4 million in federal lobbying in the third quarter of 2026 alone, among the highest totals of any organization. Its consumer messaging is just as well funded. NAR paid more than $66 million to its top three contractors for media, marketing, PR and communications. Housing portals spend on a similar scale. CoStar’s Homes.com is backed by roughly $1 billion or more in marketing, including Super Bowl campaigns in 2024 and 2025.
The American tax code reinforces the message. The mortgage interest deduction is one of the largest federal tax expenditures at about $70 billion a year, yet it appears to do little to expand homeownership. The tax benefits for owner occupied housing as a whole have been estimated at about $175 billion a year.
Those subsidies flow disproportionately to taxpayers in upper income brackets. The industry argues these policies support homeownership and household wealth. Critics argue they inflate prices.
In Canada, the stakes are larger relative to the economy. Real estate, rental and leasing made up about 13.2 percent of GDP, the largest share of any single industry in Canada. Economic activity tied to residential investment supported more than 1.2 million jobs in 2025. The Canadian Real Estate Association lobbies at the grassroots level. Its PAC Reps pass regional concerns to CREA and keep their local MPs informed on national issues affecting the industry.
In its own materials, CREA says it advocates policies that increase housing supply and give Canadians access to safe, stable and affordable housing. The clearest case of developer influence was provincial. In Ontario’s Greenbelt affair, an investigation found that Housing Minister Steve Clark’s chief of staff “substantially controlled and directed” the removal of protected land, giving preferential treatment to a group of developers. The government later reversed the land removals.
“Buy now or be priced out forever” is classic urgency messaging. In Canada, where real estate is about 13 percent of GDP, many people’s retirement and many governments’ revenue depend on prices staying high. That gives almost everyone in power a reason to keep the message going.
Fighting Propaganda
Even the most open democracies cannot eliminate persuasive messaging altogether, yet nations with the highest levels of press freedom rely on deliberate structural safeguards to keep state and corporate propaganda in check. Rather than tethering public broadcasters to direct government budgets, where politicians can use the threat of funding cuts to punish critical reporting, these countries finance public media through dedicated taxes or license fees that insulate editorial independence. They also enforce strict ownership laws to prevent any single billionaire, corporation, or political faction from consolidating control over major news outlets, while tight spending caps or outright bans on paid television campaign ads curtail the flood of domestic political spin.
Education plays an equally vital role. Countries like Finland and Estonia weave media literacy into primary school curricula, equipping citizens from an early age to verify sources and recognize emotional manipulation before it takes root. Still, institutional guardrails have their limits. Private corporations continue to deploy sophisticated commercial advertising to shape public habits, and an open internet inevitably leaves free societies exposed to covert foreign influence campaigns, making vigilant journalism and an informed citizenry indispensable.
Commercial Propaganda - Advertising
To observe propaganda stripped of flags, anthems, and political manifestos, one need only examine modern advertising. When pioneers such as Edward Bernays formalized public relations during the 1920s, they deliberately adapted the psychological techniques forged in wartime information ministries for corporate boardrooms, recognizing that durable persuasion relies on tapping into human anxieties around status, security, and belonging rather than presenting rational facts.
Current Ads Context
Today, this commercial apparatus exceeds one trillion dollars in annual global spending and operates through a decentralized network of corporations, data brokers, and technology platforms. Its methods vary sharply across mediums. Traditional television and print campaigns rely on gradual emotional conditioning and celebrity association to build aspirational brand identities over decades, whereas digital platforms such as Meta, Google, and TikTok use continuous surveillance to build behavioral profiles and deliver micro-targeted pitches at moments of heightened vulnerability. Meanwhile, as younger audiences learn to ignore conventional banners, brands increasingly rely on influencer sponsorships that disguise commercial appeals as authentic personal recommendations.
Uneven Advertising Regulation
Given the sophistication of this persuasive machinery, a consumer's resilience against manipulation depends far less on personal willpower than on legal jurisdiction, age, and socioeconomic status. Citizens in the European Union and Nordic countries such as Sweden and Norway enjoy the strongest protections in the world, backed by laws such as the General Data Protection Regulation and the Digital Services Act that restrict behavioral tracking, prohibit profiling based on sensitive traits, and ban targeted ads aimed at minors. Sweden and Norway go further by outlawing television and digital advertisements directed at children under twelve altogether.
By contrast, consumers in jurisdictions lacking comprehensive federal privacy laws, including the United States and much of the developing world, face an unguarded digital marketplace where data brokers freely trade personal profiles. Within these weakly regulated environments, vulnerable demographics bear the heaviest burden, including adolescents exposed to body-image algorithms, financially distressed adults targeted by predatory lenders and gambling apps, and older adults misled by deceptive health and financial advertorials.
Ad Reform
Reforming this ecosystem does not require abolishing commercial speech, which finances much of the public's free access to news and entertainment. Instead, it requires clear structural guardrails that restore transparency and human autonomy. The single most effective reform policymakers could enact is banning surveillance-based micro-targeting in favor of contextual advertising, which matches commercial messages to the content a person is actively viewing rather than to a private dossier of their personal habits. Pairing that shift with universal bans on targeted advertising for minors, unambiguous visual disclosures for sponsored creator posts and synthetic media, and public repositories for inspecting digital ad campaigns would strip commercial persuasion of its covert advantage, returning advertising to a transparent offer that citizens remain free to accept or decline.
Propaganda Targets
Modern influence operations do not distribute their efforts evenly across the globe. Instead, foreign states concentrate their resources on nations that offer high geopolitical leverage, occupy strategic fault lines, or maintain open information environments that are easy to penetrate.
According to threat intelligence from European Union monitors, Microsoft, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the heaviest waves of foreign disinformation target Ukraine, the United States, major Western European powers like France and Germany, border states such as Moldova, Taiwan, and developing nations across West Africa.
Geopolitical Fault Lines and Conflict Zones
In active conflict zones and contested regions, information warfare serves as a direct extension of military and diplomatic strategy. Ukraine absorbs the highest volume of foreign information attacks in the world, as campaigns attempt to erode civilian morale and convince Western allies to halt military aid. Similarly, Beijing directs relentless messaging at Taiwan to portray its democratic institutions as weak and convince citizens that resistance is futile.
Along the borders of Eastern Europe, countries like Moldova and Georgia face coordinated interference designed to derail their integration into the European Union. Meanwhile, across West Africa and the Sahel, foreign influence networks exploit local political instability to promote anti-Western sentiment, justify military coups, and secure lucrative resource and security agreements.
Open Democracies and Western Powers
At the same time, major Western democracies remain prime targets precisely because shifting their public opinion can alter global alliances, sanctions, and trade policies.
In the United States, Russia, China, and Iran focus heavily on election cycles to amplify domestic polarization and undermine public faith in democratic institutions.
Within the European Union, France and Germany experience the highest frequency of attacks, with campaigns tailored to inflame economic anxieties, stoke anti-immigration sentiment, and boost Eurosceptic movements. Because open democracies protect free speech and maintain uncensored internet access, foreign operators can easily blend into genuine local debates without triggering immediate censorship.
Modern Tactics of Digital Infiltration
To infiltrate these societies, modern propaganda has evolved far beyond traditional state broadcasts. Operations such as Russia's Doppelgänger and China's PAPERWALL construct hundreds of spoofed websites that mimic the exact design and branding of trusted local newspapers to trick readers into sharing fabricated stories. Operators also deploy artificial intelligence to clone the voices of real politicians, generate synthetic video scandals right before elections, and flood the internet with millions of automated articles aimed at contaminating search engines and conditioning artificial intelligence models. Combined with covert payments to local social media influencers and hyper-targeted advertisements, these tactics allow foreign powers to wage quiet, continuous campaigns inside the daily feeds of millions of citizens.
Bot Farms
The global bot farm landscape is split between state-sponsored operations (which focus on political influence) and commercial "for-hire" networks (which operate as businesses for fraud, engagement, and subcontracted propaganda).
Attribution is tricky because operators route traffic through proxies, VPNs, and cryptocurrency across multiple jurisdictions, so "where the servers are" often differs from "who is paying for them."
State-Sponsored
According to platform transparency reports (such as Meta’s) and Western intelligence agencies, Russia and China remain the most prolific state actors behind coordinated influence operations. Russia is the top overall source of disrupted covert networks (e.g., the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency and the AI-driven Meliorator system), followed closely by China (e.g., the massive Spamouflage network). Iran and Turkey also maintain notable state-linked networks.
Commercial & "Click Farm" Hubs
Physical phone farms—warehouses packed with thousands of networked smartphones and SIM cards—are heavily concentrated in Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and parts of Eastern Europe. Lower labor and hardware costs make these regions ideal for commercial bot-as-a-service operations. Increasingly, state actors simply pay these commercial Southeast Asian farms in crypto to run political campaigns on their behalf.
Technical Server Origins
If you look purely at raw automated web traffic by IP origin, the United States actually tops the list (over 35%), followed by China and Singapore. However, this is mostly because foreign actors rent cheap, high-speed cloud server space (like AWS or DigitalOcean) in the US and Singapore to mask their true locations and make traffic look domestic.
Why Bot Farms
Bot farms exist because modern digital algorithms (on social media, search engines, and ad networks) mistake volume for legitimacy.
According to cybersecurity reports (such as Imperva’s Bad Bot Report), automated bot traffic now accounts for more than 53% of all global internet traffic, officially outnumbering human activity.
Evolution of Bot Farms
Automated botnets began in the late 1990s and early 2000s, initially used for email spam, DDoS attacks, and chatroom flooding. As Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube monetized attention, commercial "click farms" emerged in developing economies—rooms full of workers manually tapping screens, which soon evolved into automated "phone boxes" controlled by a single PC.
The turning point for modern political bot farms was Russia's annexation of Crimea (2014) and the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Operations like the Internet Research Agency proved that industrial-scale fake accounts could hijack mainstream media narratives and polarize voters.
Previously, foreign bot farms were easy to spot because of broken English, copy-pasted scripts, and repetitive posting patterns. Large Language Models (LLMs) now allow a single operator to run thousands of personas that write fluent, context-aware, culturally nuanced replies in real time. Bots no longer rely on stolen profile photos; they use AI-generated faces, voices, and fabricated news articles/images to pass basic human scrutiny. With legitimate AI agents browsing the web on behalf of real users, security systems are struggling to tell the difference between a helpful AI assistant and a malicious scraping or fraud bot.
References3 sources
- [1]Andrew Pettegree. (2014). The Invention of News: How the World Came to Know About Itself. Yale University Press. https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300206227
- [2]Jürgen Habermas. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. MIT Press. https://doi.org/978-0262081801
- [3]Meta. (2022, November). Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report. https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Quarterly-Adversarial-Threat-Report-Q2-2022-1.pdf